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INTRODUCTION
In The National Security Lawyer in Crisis: When the “Best View” of the Law
May Not Be the Best View, Robert Bauer describes the challenges for executive
branch lawyers providing advice during a national security crisis.1 Bauer focuses
on two especially perilous episodes in United States history—the Cuban Missile
Crisis and the run-up to U.S. involvement in World War II—and analyzes the
legal advice Presidents Kennedy and Roosevelt, respectively, received.2 In both
cases, widely respected lawyers gave legal advice that supported the President’s
preferred outcome, but almost certainly did not represent what the lawyers con-
sidered the best view of the law.3
What lessons should we draw from these examples? Bauer, a former Counsel
to the President with considerable personal experience in crisis lawyering, argues
that the approach these lawyers took reflects the reality of legal advice during a
national security crisis: they did not provide advice that represented the best view
of the law as they understood it.4 Instead, they crafted legal arguments designed
to permit, and support the legitimacy of, policies the President deemed crucial to
national security.
The “best view” model of lawyering appears to have no formal or widely rec-
ognized definition, either in Bauer’s article or elsewhere in the literature. Perhaps
the best articulation of the concept is in the memorandum that sets out the “best
practices” for the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), which
directs OLC lawyers to “provide advice based on [their] best understanding of
what the law requires—not simply an advocate’s defense of the contemplated
action or position proposed by an agency or the Administration.” In rendering
this advice, they must seek “to provide an accurate and honest appraisal of appli-
cable law, even if that appraisal will constrain the Administration’s or an
agency’s pursuit of desired practices or policy objectives.”5 Although the memo’s
1. Robert Bauer, The National Security Lawyer in Crisis: When the “Best View” of the Law May Not Be the
Best View, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175 (2018).
2. Id. at 182–229.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of
Legal Counsel, to Attorneys of the Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and
Written Opinions (July 16, 2010) at 1, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/26/olc-
legal-advice-opinions.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ28-QHK5] [hereinafter Barron, Best Practices].
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instruction is directed to OLC lawyers only, the approach it presents is under-
stood by many to be a model for national security lawyers elsewhere in the
Executive Branch as well.6
Bauer takes a dim view of this best view model, which he considers rigid, dis-
connected from important policy context, and unworkable in a crisis.7 Bauer pro-
poses an exception to the best view approach for lawyers facing a national
security crisis. Lawyers under those circumstances, he argues, should be free to
provide alternative legal analysis that supports the preferred policy position, so
long as it is credible and made in good faith.8
Bauer’s proposal to create an exception to the best view standard for crises,
however, risks compromising the quality of national security lawyering overall.
National security lawyers in the Executive Branch practice in an environment
without many of the formal and informal incentives for high-quality legal advice
that are common in other fields. The stakes are unusually high, which increases
pressure from policymakers. At the same time, there is less external oversight
from the courts and Congress, and the secrecy of much of the subject matter
makes peer and public input difficult. Because of these challenges, it is important
to build into the process of developing national security legal advice as many pro-
tections for high-quality legal analysis as possible.9 The best view standard is
such a protection, and a critical one.
Bauer’s concern about a best view approach stems, in part, from his view that
it requires lawyers to develop their legal advice in a manner that is insulated from
policy developments and concerns.10 He argues persuasively that such a clois-
tered process is unworkable, particularly in a national security crisis.11 But this
kind of separation is not necessary to a best view model of lawyering and is not
now, nor has it been for much of the last twenty-five years, the way national secu-
rity legal advice develops. Instead, for most of that time, senior lawyers from the
6. This observation is based on the author’s experience as a senior national security lawyer in two presiden-
tial administrations and from numerous discussions with other practitioners. In particular, it is an understanding
that has guided many discussions of the Lawyers Group, discussed infra notes 91–105 and accompanying text.
7. Bauer, supra note 1, at 175–76.
8. Id. at 182.
9. What constitutes “high quality” legal advice or lawyering is, of course, open to considerable debate.
Some would emphasize lawyers’ responsibility to carry out their fiduciary duty to a client by helping to advance
the client’s interests. Others would place a higher priority on the need for attention to professional standards,
rigor in craft, and honest interpretation of precedent. Recognizing that the former is a critical component of
high-quality lawyering, when this comment discusses threats to high-quality lawyering, its focus primarily is
the latter concern. Indeed, as discussed infra notes 114–16 and accompanying text, for Executive Branch law-
yers, more than those practicing in the private sector, the two responsibilities often move in the same direction.
Because it is the President’s responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” United States
Constitution, Article II, Section 3, rigor in the interpretation of the law is part of the client interest that an
Executive Branch lawyer must uphold. This responsibility applies not only to advice about the client’s immedi-
ate question, but the long-term impact of the precedent that the advice might establish for the Executive
Branch.
10. See infra notes 67–71 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
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national security agencies have considered key legal questions through a
“Lawyers Group” process. Far from being insulated from the policy process,
Lawyers Group members are in the middle of that process and work closely with
their policy clients.12 Close connection to policy development does not prevent
these lawyers from applying a best view standard, even during a crisis.
The best view standard is important to high-quality national security lawyering
not because it always results in an objectively “right” legal answer—that is not
possible. Instead, the best view standard acts as a guidepost—a regulative ideal—
for lawyers, reminding them of their distinctive role in the process and grounding
them with an external professional standard.13 It serves as a counterweight to the
inevitable pressures that these lawyers face. It also honors and upholds the unique
responsibilities of Executive Branch lawyers to assist the President in carrying
out his constitutional responsibility to see that the laws are faithfully executed.14
Bauer’s proposal to recognize a lower standard in crisis situations would subvert
this protection across the board. If a best view approach is optional, it loses its
regulative power as a protection for high-quality lawyering.
Bauer argues that his proposal is modest, limited only to crisis situations, and
is protected from abuse by a requirement of transparency by policymakers.15 In
practice, however, the limitation to crisis situations is unworkable. He provides
no definition of crisis and acknowledges that “no hard-and-fast rule”16 is possible
for determining the existence of a crisis. Indeed, he concedes that the line
between normalcy and emergency is “difficult, if not impossible” to identify.17
Thus, given the nature of national security policy—where most things feel like a
crisis—the increased flexibility in standard and process would almost inevita-
bly expand to encompass more than Bauer intends. Nor does his proposed pro-
tection of transparency provide any real safeguard against abuse of this
process. Transparency, although a powerful and important check, is inadequate
as the sole protection against abuse because it is extremely difficult to institu-
tionalize in the national security process.
12. See infra notes 91–100 and accompanying text. The term “client” here, and throughout this comment,
refers to the President and the other officials in policy and operational positions to whom national security law-
yers provide their advice. In fact, government lawyers’ obligations run not to the officeholders, but to the offices
that they hold. Thus, the White House Counsel’s “client” is the Office of the President and, perhaps, more
broadly to the U.S. Government and the American people. This is an important distinction. For the purposes of
this comment, however, unless stated otherwise, the individuals holding those positions will be presumed to
reflect the interests of their offices.
13. See infra notes 110–13 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
15. See Bauer, supra note 1, at 181–82.
16. Id. at 252.
17. Id. (quoting Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crisis Always be
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1022 (2003)).
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Bauer’s proposed departure from the best view standard would, therefore, risk
becoming the norm for national security lawyering. If that were the case, a critical
safeguard for the quality of national security lawyering would be lost.
This Comment will consider Bauer’s proposal to depart from a best view
approach. Part I describes the unique challenges that national security lawyers in
the Executive Branch face in providing high-quality legal advice. Because exter-
nal checks on the quality of legal analysis are generally less effective in the
national security field, it becomes particularly important to build internal protec-
tions like the best view standard into the process of developing national security
legal advice. Part II examines Bauer’s definition of the “best view” approach to
lawyering and argues that the best view is far more flexible than his conception
and can be used effectively in national security crisis situations. Part III explains
why the best view approach is a critical protection for high-quality national secu-
rity lawyering. The best view acts as a regulative ideal: an external professional
standard to guide the deliberations of national security lawyers and uphold the
unique responsibilities of Executive Branch lawyers. Finally, Part IV looks at
Bauer’s argument that his proposal represents only a limited exception to a best
view approach. The section concludes that his proposal would inevitably expand
and undermine the regulative power of the best view standard, thereby reducing
overall the quality of national security lawyering.
I. CHALLENGES TO HIGH-QUALITY NATIONAL SECURITY LAWYERING
External oversight improves the quality of analysis and decision-making
directly—by identifying and correcting errors and missteps—and indirectly—by
forcing decision-makers to develop, articulate, and defend their arguments more
carefully.18 The knowledge that someone will be evaluating the persuasiveness of
your analysis creates a valuable incentive to identify and address possible oppos-
ing arguments. Conversely, if it is less likely that other branches of government
or the public will demand well-reasoned legal decision-making, the quality of
advice can suffer. To be sure, there is external oversight of Executive Branch
national security legal advice, from courts, Congress, and from the public,
through the work of journalists who focus on legal decision-making. But the sen-
sitive nature of so many national security matters and the secrecy with which
18. See Mary DeRosa & Mitt Regan, Deliberative Constitutionalism in the National Security Setting, in
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF DELIBERATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM (Ron Levy et al. eds., forthcoming 2018)
(discussing the risks that limited external oversight can pose: “If there is minimal likelihood that other branches
or the public will demand a full well-reasoned explanation for a decision, the quality of the deliberation that
precedes it may suffer. This in turn can impair its perceived legitimacy.”) [hereinafter DeRosa & Regan,
Deliberative Constitutionalism]; Simone Chambers, Behind Closed Doors: Publicity, Secrecy, and the Quality
of Deliberation, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 389, 391 (2004) (explaining the requirement to justify oneself to others creates
“the necessity to articulate one’s position carefully, to defend it against unexpected counter arguments, to take
opposing points of view into consideration, to reveal the steps of reasoning one has used, and to state openly
the principles to which one appeals.”).
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they are handled, makes this oversight less common and less effective than in
other disciplines, creating risks for the quality of lawyering.
A. THE COURTS
National security law, far more than most other disciplines, is defined and
interpreted in the Executive Branch.19 With increasing frequency in the last half
century,20 courts have relied on justiciability rules—primarily Article III
Standing and the Political Question doctrine—to avoid reaching decisions on sen-
sitive national security legal issues.21 In this way, courts have refused to weigh in
on key legal questions related to the appropriateness of military operations,22 the
legality of United States’ surveillance activities,23 and many other complex legal
questions.
The Article III standing requirement is a key element of the Constitution’s li-
mitation of federal courts’ jurisdiction to “cases” and “controversies.”24 When
courts consider Article III standing, they are determining whether the litigant
challenging government action is entitled to have the court reach the merits of
their claim.25 The Supreme Court has explained that the law of Article III stand-
ing “serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of
the political branches.”26 To establish Article III standing, an injury “must be
‘concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the chal-
lenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.’”27 Courts’ application of
standing rules have had a significant impact on cases involving classified national
security programs.28
19. Stephen I. Vladeck, The Demise of Merits-Based Adjudication in Post-9/11 National Security
Litigation, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 1035, 1038–39 (2016) [hereinafter Vladeck,Merits-Based Adjudication].
20. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 122 (2011).
21. Vladeck, Merits-Based Adjudication, supra note 19, at 1038–39 (“[A]lthough some of these doctrines
are trans-substantive, and thus, are barriers to merits-based adjudication in all civil litigation against the govern-
ment, many of them either uniquely apply to, or have been uniquely stretched to encompass, challenges to
national security policies. Thus, the phenomenon . . . is much more than just the application of a more general
trend against merits-based civil adjudication to the specific subset of national security suits; rather, it is the very
real creation of what I have elsewhere described as ‘the new national security canon.’”).
22. See Jaber v. United States, 861 F.3d 241, 247–48 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (court held a declaratory judgment
action that alleged United States drone strike in Yemen violated domestic and international law was barred by
the political question doctrine because it called for court to pass judgment on wisdom of the Executive
Branch’s decision to commence military action and “[i]n matters of political and military strategy, courts lack
the competence necessary to determine whether the use of force was justified.”); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v.
United States, 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (court rejects challenge to Clinton Administration strike
on a chemical plant in Sudan).
23. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398 (2012).
24. Id. at 408.
25. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
26. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 408.
27. Id. at 409 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)).
28. Vladeck, Merits-Based Adjudication, supra note 19, at 1042 (“But whereas the Court’s hostility to
standing has generally been trans-substantive, it has had an especial impact on challenges to secret government
programs.”).
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In Clapper v. Amnesty International, for example, the Supreme Court rejected
the standing claim of a group of “attorneys and human rights, labor, legal, and
media organizations”29 whose jobs required them to engage in sensitive commu-
nications with clients and sources abroad.30 The group challenged section 702 of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which authorized certain kinds
of mass electronic surveillance on non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be
outside the United States.31 Plaintiffs argued that section 702 made it far more
likely that their communications would be intercepted and, because the provision
had no requirement for individualized suspicion, it was unconstitutional.32 The
Clapper Court concluded that the plaintiffs could not reach the merits of their
arguments33 because they did not “face a threat of certainly impending intercep-
tion” under section 702.34 Therefore the harm they claimed—costs incurred to
avoid surveillance—were “simply the product of their fear of surveillance”35 and
did not give rise to standing.36
Courts also regularly invoke the Political Question doctrine to avoid decisions
on the merits of cases they deem more appropriate for resolution by the political
branches. As Stephen Vladeck has explained,
Although it has its origins in Marbury v. Madison, in contemporary terms, the
political question doctrine is shorthand for two primary but distinct objections
to judicial review—either because the Constitution commits resolution of the
dispute to other branches of the government or because the claims lack “judi-
cially manageable standards.37
So, for example, in El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United States,
the D.C. Circuit applied the Political Question doctrine to dismiss a case involv-
ing a claim by the owner of a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant who argued
President Clinton’s allegation that he was affiliated with terrorists defamed him.38
The court concluded that to reach the merits would require it to rule on whether
the decision to bomb the pharmaceutical plant was “mistaken and not justified,”39
which would be a political question. The court explained, “[t]he political question
doctrine bars our review of claims that, regardless of how they are styled, call
29. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 406.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 401–02 (citing § 1881a of the FISA Amendments Act).
32. Id. at 407.
33. Id. at 417–18.
34. Id. at 417.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Vladeck, Merits-Based Adjudication, supra note 19, at 1045 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,
170–71 (1803) and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
38. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
39. Id. at 844.
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into question the prudence of the political branches in matters of foreign policy or
national security constitutionally committed to their discretion.”40
Other doctrines have also acted to reduce court review of the legality of actions
the government takes in the name of national security. These include the State
Secrets privilege,41 which operates to exclude privileged state secrets from evi-
dence and can sometimes result in dismissal of a case, and the “Totten bar,”42
which can be invoked to dismiss a case when its entire subject matter is deemed
to be a state secret, such as a lawsuit seeking to enforce an agreement to spy for
the United States.43
To be sure, these threshold doctrines do not eliminate all judicial review of
national security matters. A series of Supreme Court cases arising out of the Bush
Administration’s policies, for example, have provided significant direction on
issues related to detention,44 Guantanamo Bay,45 and military commissions.46
However, the collective impact of this judicial restraint in national security cases
is to limit oversight of Executive Branch legal interpretations.47 This leaves
Executive Branch lawyers who advise on national security matters with limited
judicial direction on the major issues with which they grapple regularly,48 and
limited expectation that their legal analysis will receive substantive review by the
court.
B. OTHER EXTERNAL OVERSIGHT
Other external forces, such as the United States Congress and the press, also
operate less effectively as a check in national security than in other areas. The
United States Congress can play an important role in questioning Executive
Branch legal analysis and has done so on a number of occasions. For example,
during the 2011 United States intervention in Libya, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee questioned Obama Administration State Department Legal Adviser
Harold Koh at length about the Administration’s controversial interpretation of
40. Id.
41. SeeUnited States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
42. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
43. Id.
44. SeeHamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
45. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
46. SeeHamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
47. But cf. Ashley S. Deeks, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes,
and Judicial Deference, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 830 (2013) (Acknowledging courts’ deference to the
Executive Branch on national security issues, but arguing that courts still, in practice, play a significant role in
executive branch decisionmaking: “When the executive faces a credible threat of litigation or the pendency of
one or more specific cases, it often alters the affected national security policies in ways that render them more
rights protective.”).
48. Bauer discusses this “long history of judges, most markedly in national security cases, finding ways to
defer to executive judgment,” and argues that the relative lack of judicial direction makes identifying a true
“best view” of the law more difficult. See Bauer, supra note 1, at 231.
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the “60-day clock” provision of the War Powers Resolution.49 Similarly, several
congressional committees have held hearings on Executive Branch interpreta-
tions of its authority to use force in counterterror operations.50
On some highly classified matters, however, members of Congress—even
those who sit on the congressional intelligence committees—have struggled to
raise effective challenges to Executive Branch legal interpretations with which
they disagree. In 2003, Senator John D. Rockefeller, then Chairman of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), was alarmed after receiving a White
House briefing about Bush Administration surveillance activities that were pro-
tected under a security compartment codenamed “STELLARWIND.”51 An
Executive Branch lawyer from OLC had written a legal opinion supporting the le-
gality of the activities.52 Rockefeller had doubts about the program’s wisdom and
legality, but was unable to talk to lawyers or others on his staff.53 Instead, he
recorded his concerns in a two-page handwritten letter, which he had delivered to
Vice President Cheney. The letter read in part “[c]learly, the activities we dis-
cussed raise profound oversight issues. As you know, I am neither a technician
nor an attorney. Given the security restrictions associated with this information,
and my inability to consult staff or counsel on my own, I feel unable to fully eval-
uate, much less endorse these activities.”54 Rockefeller placed a copy of the letter
in a sealed envelope in the SSCI’s secure office space.55 He released the letter
public two years later, only when certain elements of the STELLARWIND pro-
gram had been declassified after being leaked to the New York Times.56
49. Libya and War Powers: Hearing before the Comm. On Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. (2011) (state-
ment of Hon. Harold Koh, Dep’t of State Legal Advisor), https://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/
docview/t29.d30.hrg-2011-for-0023?accountid=36339 [https://perma.cc/DTL5-MCQH].
50. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for example, has held hearings on the President’s authority to
use force on several occasions, including three in 2017: December 13, 2017, Using Force: Strategic, Political,
and Legal Considerations: Hearing Before the S. Foreign Relations Comm., 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.
foreign.senate.gov/hearings/using-force-strategic-political-and-legal-considerations-121317 [https://perma.cc/
Z9LZ-583C]; August 2, 2017, The Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Administration Perspective:
Hearing Before the S. Foreign Relations Comm., 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.foreign.senate.gov/
hearings/the-authorizations-for-the-use-of-military-force-administration-perspective-080217 [https://perma.
cc/W5DZ-GNBH]; June 20, 2017, Reviewing Congressional Authorizations for the Use of Military Force:
Hearing Before the S. Foreign Relations Comm., 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/
reviewing-congressional-authorization-for-the-use-of-military-force-062017 [https://perma.cc/494K-KH2U].
51. Ryan Lizza, State of Deception: Why won’t the President reign in the Intelligence Community?, NEW
YORKER (Dec. 16, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/12/16/state-of-deception [https://perma.
cc/MFE3-LBHS].
52. Id.
53. See Letter from Sen. Jay Rockefeller to Vice President Richard Cheney (July 17, 2003), https://fas.org/
irp/news/2005/12/rock121905.pdf [https://perma.cc/2S3P-ZE76].
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Peter Baker & Charles Babington, Bush Addresses Uproar Over Spying, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/19/AR2005121900211.html [https://perma.
cc/24V2-SJDL].
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In a more recent example of the challenges for congressional oversight of clas-
sified legal analysis, Senator Ron Wyden and a few other Senators, also members
of the SSCI, raised concerns about a classified legal interpretation of the
PATRIOT Act’s business records provision, which permitted bulk collection of
certain telephone metadata. The interpretation had been briefed to SSCI members
and others in Congress and approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC). Nonetheless, Wyden and others believed that “the language of the
PATRIOT Act had been stretched beyond recognition”57 and that the program
the interpretation supported “was something very different from what Americans
thought was going on.”58 Wyden and the other senators wrote letters to senior
Executive Branch officials conveying their concerns and seeking declassification
of the contested legal interpretation.59 Because the issue was classified, the sena-
tors felt they could go no further than vague public statements.60 As journalist
Charlie Savage has written “a few Democratic lawmakers who knew the [classi-
fied legal interpretation] began raising cryptic alarms that something was amiss
with how the government was interpreting the Patriot Act, but no one could figure
out what they were talking about.”61
Later, when the interpretation became public after leaks by NSA contractor
Edward Snowden, it was widely criticized.62 That is not to say the interpretation
was, in fact, incorrect or that the underlying program was illegal. What it does
demonstrate is the challenge for members of Congress in raising concerns about
the legal analysis supporting sensitive national security programs. This is a diffi-
culty that does not exist in most other areas that Congress oversees.
In his book Power and Constraint, Jack Goldsmith describes the significant
role “accountability journalism”63 has played as an informal check on national se-
curity policy. “The press’s many revelations about the government’s conduct of
the war were at the foundation of all the mechanisms of presidential accountabil-
ity after 9/11. They informed the public and shaped its opinions, and spurred ac-
tivist, courts, and Congress to action in changing the government’s course.”64
Journalism on national security legal decision making has also thrived during this
period. New York Times reporter Charlie Savage, for example, has written exten-
sively about legal debates and the development of national security legal
57. 159 CONG. REC. H6053–56 (daily ed. 2013) (remarks of Senator Ron Wyden on the senate floor).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS: INSIDE OBAMA’S POST-9/11 PRESIDENCY 168 (2015).
62. See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, Verizon Providing All Call Records to U.S. Under Court Order, WASH.
POST (June 6, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/verizon-providing-all-call-
records-to-us-under-court-order/2013/06/05/98656606-ce47-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html?utm_term=.
6ea9cdf3a0be [https://perma.cc/KSW5-NURU].
63. JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 56 (2012).
64. Id. at 57.
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advice.65 This reporting shines a light on otherwise secret advice, attracting pub-
lic discussion and, in some cases, criticism. Knowing that secret interpretations
may become public naturally leads lawyers to take more care in their delibera-
tions and ultimate advice. Still, because the subject matter of so much of the
advice is classified, reporters have less access to definitive official sources and
must rely on lawyers and others with knowledge who are willing to leak informa-
tion, often in violation of laws, regulations, and agreements that protect classified
information. As a result, the reporting is sporadic and often delayed. This journal-
ism is not, therefore, a consistent, reliable source of accountability for national se-
curity lawyers.66
The fact that this shielding from oversight reduces one important informal in-
centive for high-quality lawyering in the national security field heightens the im-
portance of building other such incentives into the process of developing national
security legal advice. A requirement that legal analysis and advice represents the
best view of the law, as the lawyers understand it, is such a protection, and a criti-
cal one. The next section will examine what the “best view” approach means,
whether it is practical in the context of national security lawyering, and whether
Bauer’s criticisms of the approach are valid.
II. WHAT IS THE “BEST VIEW”?
To assess Bauer’s arguments against the use of a best view approach, it is first
necessary to understand how he believes the model works. Bauer describes two
features of a best view approach. First, as the name suggests, lawyers following a
best view approach will provide legal advice that represents the best view of the
law as they understand it. Second, Bauer sees a requirement that lawyers follow-
ing a best view model be separate and insulated from policymakers and policy
discussions. Bauer directs much of his criticism of the best view model at this
notion of a separation requirement. As discussed below, separation is not neces-
sary for a best view approach. Bauer’s depiction of a process in which lawyers
must operate separately and protected from the policy process in order to provide
the best view of the law is not what most commentators and practitioners would
recommend, and it is not the way those providing advice in this area actually op-
erate when they apply a best view standard.
65. See SAVAGE, supra note 61.
66. Cf. Oona Hathaway, Power Wars Symposium: The Savage Effect, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 2, 2015),
https://www.justsecurity.org/27276/savage-effect/ [https://perma.cc/5QLD-GCML] (“But the downsides of
such heavy reliance on a reporter for a glimpse into our government’s inner workings are obvious: Savage must
get his information from sources, and those sources often have an agenda or a limited view of the issue at hand.
(They are also, it bears mentioning again, often breaking their legal and ethical obligations not to disclose
classified or confidential information.) That means that the glimpse he is offered is necessarily a skewed one.”).
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A. SEPARATION AND THE “BEST VIEW”
In Bauer’s telling, those seeking the best view of the law must be “as insulated
as possible from policy.”67 He sees lawyers playing a “distant consultative role”
when providing their advice, which “remain[s] a factor unto itself.”68 As Bauer
describes it, to arrive at the best view, lawyers are expected to “purge from their
work any consideration” of policy consequences and entertain discrete questions
on which they deliberate and “return” to present their answers.69 In other words,
if lawyers are involved in the policy decision-making process, if they are “in the
game,” to use a phrase quoted often in Bauer’s article, they have departed from
the best view approach.
Bauer goes on to criticize this separation model. He argues that insulation from
policy is “more than we should ask or certainly expect” from lawyers in a national
security crisis.70 As discussed below, Bauer makes a persuasive argument that
separation from the policy process often is not the best way for lawyers to provide
advice on fast-moving, high-stakes national security issues. The lack of separa-
tion, however, should not be considered fatal to a goal of providing the best view
of the law.
That lawyers have a responsibility to maintain some independence from their
clients has long been accepted in the practice.71 Independence and a distinctive
professional identity are necessary, according to Robert Gordon in his influential
article on the subject, because lawyers “influence their clients to some extent,
whether they want to or not . . . . They can’t choose not to be influential, they can
only decide not to think about their influence and whether they should exercise it
differently.”72 Gordon advocates for “[t]he ideal of independence” because it
“requires lawyers to reflect and deliberate about the nature and results of that
influence, as well as act prudently . . . to change whatever results of that influence
are bad ones.”73 Independence does not, however, require separation from clients
and their decision-making.
Some commentators, particularly in the wake of legal controversies during the
George W. Bush Administration, have embraced a separation model of govern-
ment lawyering. They argue that lawyers will only fairly and independently
address difficult questions of law if they are removed from client influence and
play a quasi-judicial role. The most notable in this camp is Bruce Ackerman, who
has argued that the White House Counsel’s office and the Justice Department’s
OLC are unable to provide fair and accurate advice on executive power issues
67. Bauer, supra note 1, at 181.
68. Id. at 181, 239.
69. Id. at 246.
70. Id. at 246.
71. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1988).
72. Id. at 30.
73. Id.
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because their occupants are loyal to the President who appointed them and are,
therefore, interested in facilitating his policies.74 Ackerman has proposed abolish-
ing those offices75 and in their place creating a “Supreme Executive Tribunal”
within the Executive Branch that would be “insulated from ex parte influence”
meaning “no more telephone calls” from the White House Counsel or others
working for the President.76 Ackerman envisions the tribunal instead rendering
its opinions based on formal briefs and oral arguments.77
Similarly, Neal Katyal has proposed an Executive Branch “Director of
Adjudication,” appointed for a term of four years and separated from the
President and policy process.78 This Director should take on the opinion-writing
and adjudicative function of OLC because, Katyal argues, OLC lawyers are “reg-
ularly present at White House meetings” and “[s]imply put, they are lawyers with
a client to serve.”79
Bauer makes a strong case against this separation model. A close relationship
between the lawyers and the policy process is critical to developing policy that is
both effective and legal. First, when lawyers are present as policy develops, they
can identify and address legal questions and concern as they arise. Lawyers can
help steer policy in a direction that is legally sound. When lawyers are separated
from policy development, they may be asked for legal advice at a later stage,
requiring a starker and more difficult “yes” or “no” answer.80 In addition, when
lawyers are a part of the process, they have easier access to facts that are relevant
to their analysis, thereby improving the quality of their advice. Separation from
the policy process makes the lawyers’ job harder and their advice potentially less
relevant and useful. Even if separation were the better model, it is simply unreal-
istic to suggest that national security lawyers, particularly in the crisis situations
that are Bauer’s focus, will be able to separate themselves from policy decision
making. The stakes of decisions are too high and the pace too fast for lawyers to
be able to shield themselves from policy.
74. See Bruce Ackerman, Abolish the White House Counsel, And the Office of Legal Counsel Too, While
We’re At It, SLATE (Apr. 22, 2009), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2009/04/
abolish_the_white_house_counsel.html [https://perma.cc/3VF6-TNRY] [hereinafter Ackerman, Abolish the
White House Counsel]; Bruce Ackerman, Lost Inside the Beltway: A Reply to Professor Morrison, 124 HARV.
L. REV. F. 13 (2011) [hereinafter Ackerman, Lost Inside the Beltway].
75. Ackerman, Abolish the White House Counsel, supra note 74.
76. Ackerman, Lost Inside the Beltway, supra note 74, at 38.
77. Id.
78. Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from
Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2337 (2006).
79. Id.
80. See Harold Hongju Koh, Protecting the Office of Legal Counsel from Itself, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 513,
515 (1993) (Koh identifies the problem of “lock-in,” which can occur when the lawyer—he was speaking spe-
cifically of OLC—is asked to evaluate the legality of a course of action to which the government has already
committed itself. He argues that the lawyer can then feel “locked into a position by its client’s action” and
“forced to issue a legal opinion justifying that action after the fact.”).
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A preference for separation is not, however, the prevailing view among com-
mentators, including the writers Bauer quotes in his article, many of whom have
a background in the Department of Justice’s OLC. Bauer focuses on the role of
the OLC, which he sees as the embodiment of the cloistered best view approach.81
Among the lawyers who advise Executive Branch policymakers, OLC lawyers
are the most institutionally detached from the policy process;82 they do not typi-
cally participate directly in the policy process to the same degree that agency gen-
eral counsel and legal advisers do. Nonetheless, these former OLC writers do not
argue lawyers should “purge from their work any consideration” of policy conse-
quences or be “as insulated as possible from policy.”83
Dawn Johnsen, a former acting head of OLC, argues for independent OLC
legal advice that is “accurate and honest” and “unbiased by policymakers’
preferred outcomes,”84 but does not suggest that this advice must develop in a
manner that is insulated from policymakers or policy preferences. Johnsen
acknowledges that the OLC is not a “disinterested arbiter” and its “charge is to
help the President achieve desired policies in conformity with the law.”85 When
lawyers have advised that a proposed policy is not consistent with law, Johnsen
says their role should not end there. Instead, they “should help the President and
policymakers achieve objectives through alternative lawful means.”86 Johnsen
argues that this is important, in part, because it could be destructive in the long
term to OLC’s goals and to the rule of law if OLC were perceived to be “unhelp-
ful and unnecessarily negative.”87
Jack Goldsmith ran the OLC during a tumultuous period of the George W.
Bush Administration and was responsible for the repeal of several formal opin-
ions authored by his predecessors.88 Goldsmith has described the importance of
independence and “loyalty to the institution and to the law,” while recognizing
that a lawyer is “a member of the Executive Branch and is not neutral to the
President’s or to the commander’s agenda.”89 He approvingly quotes former
81. See Bauer, supra note 1, at 181–82 (“[I]t is self-defeating to insist on a ‘best view,’ or to commit the
assignment of finding one to the exclusive control of a specialized corps of lawyers, which at the present time
and for this purpose is the OLC.”).
82. This has been less true on national security matters, as discussed infra notes 101–05 and accompanying text.
83. Indeed, the Office of Legal Counsel “best practices” to which Bauer refers often, speak of OLC’s
responsibility to “[facilitate] the work of the Executive Branch and the objectives of the President, consistent
with the law” although the advice may not be “designed merely to advance” policy preferences. Barron, Best
Practices, supra note 5, at 2.
84. Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA
L. REV. 1559, 1595 (2007).
85. Id. at 1581.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1601.
88. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 38–39 (2007).
89. Jack Goldsmith, Reflections on Government Lawyering, 205 MIL. L. REV. 192, 196 (2010) [hereinafter
Goldsmith, Reflections].
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Attorney General Elliot Richardson, who said, “[a]dvice to a President needs to
have the political question clearly in view, without regard to any pejoratives
attached to the word political.”90
B. THE LAWYERS GROUP
Thus, much of the expert commentary on the role of national security lawyers
does not advocate a cloistered process for developing legal advice. More impor-
tantly, for better or worse, this kind of separation is not now, nor has it been for
much of the last twenty-five years, the way national security legal advice devel-
ops in the Executive Branch, even as, for much of that time, lawyers have fol-
lowed a best view approach. In contrast to the separation model, legal advice for
the President and his senior advisors and policymakers has developed through
what has become known as the national security “Lawyers Group” process.91 Far
from being insulated from the policy process, Lawyers Group members are in the
middle of that process and work closely with their policy clients.92 Bauer does
not discuss this Lawyers Group, which played a critical and high profile role in
national security legal advice during the Obama Administration.93
90. Id. In his 2000 article Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A Perspective from the office of Legal
Counsel, 2 ADMIN. L. REV. 1303 [hereinafter Moss, Executive Branch Legal Determination], another former
OLC head, Randolph Moss, comes closest to articulating the more separated role that Bauer describes. Moss
discusses the role of the Attorney General and OLC specifically. He does not suggest that executive branch law-
yers applying a “best view” standard must be insulated from the policy process. Indeed, he rejects a judge-like
model of OLC behavior that “shuns consideration of his client’s desired policy goals and acts instead with com-
plete impartiality” as “a caricature.” Id. at 1306. Moss does, however, contemplate a neutral, even “quasi-
judicial,” role for OLC. Even so, Moss promotes as an “important” role for OLC lawyers, which they play on
“almost a daily basis,” working with clients to “refine and reconceptualize proposed executive branch initia-
tives in the face of legal constraints.” Id. at 1329. Thus, he does not propose a model of separation from clients’
policy concerns and goals.
Bauer also refers to criticism from Rosa Brooks—a former Department of Defense official—of some of the
George W. Bush Administration’s legal positions and her analogy of government lawyering to the game of ten-
nis. Nothing in her discussion, however, suggests that Brooks advocates development of legal advice ignorant
of policy consequences. Indeed, Brooks recognizes that lawyer may at times “skirt the edge of the permissible,”
presumably for policy reasons, but be “clearly within the rule” and “not cheating.” ROSA BROOKS, HOW
EVERYTHING BECAMEWAR AND THE MILITARY BECAME EVERYTHING: TALES FROM THE PENTAGON 55 (2016).
91. See SAVAGE, supra note 61, at 64–65.
92. Id.
93. 94. Id. The Lawyers Group process itself, like the best view standard, is an important protection for the
quality of national security lawyering. See DeRosa & Regan, Deliberative Constitutionalism, supra note 18,
35–41 (arguing that the deliberative process that the Group provides enhances the quality and perceived legiti-
macy of national security decision making); Harold Hongju Koh, National Security Legal Advice in the New
Administration, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/34507/national-security-legal-
advice-administration/ [https://perma.cc/9DZ3-JVL3] (“what this interagency process helped to accomplish
was that essentially all legal decisions of import regarding US national security issues—including confidential
and covert operations—and any change in US government legal position, were vetted through the general
counsels of all relevant agencies. Different agencies have different equities, perspectives, and areas of expertise
and getting the input of all relevant legal arms of our vast executive branch is vital to sound decisionmaking.”)
[hereinafter Koh, National Security Legal Advice].
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The Lawyers Group includes the senior lawyers from the major national secu-
rity agencies who meet regularly to deliberate and reach consensus on legal
advice for the President and the members of his National Security Council.94 The
Group’s core participants include the National Security Council (NSC) Legal
Adviser,95 who is the President’s senior national security lawyer and convenes
the Group; the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Justice Department’s
OLC; the State Department Legal Adviser; the General Counsels of the
Department of Defense, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI),
and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); and the Legal Adviser to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.96 Except for the OLC representative, each
of these participants has a close advisory relationship with a senior national secu-
rity policymaker or advisor with whom he or she communicates regularly about
policy developments.97
The Lawyers Group met regularly during the Clinton Administration.98
Although during the George W. Bush Administration, at least in the early years,
lawyers largely discarded that process in favor of a less inclusive “War Council,”
which appears to have relied more frequently on formal OLC opinions for key
legal advice, the Lawyers Group process remained in use for some covert action
and intelligence matters.99 The Lawyers Group process returned and was critical
to the development of national security legal advice during the eight years of the
Obama Administration.100
94. Id.
95. Since the beginning of the Obama Administration, the National Security Council Legal Adviser has also
served as Deputy Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs. See id.
96. Id.
97. The National Security Legal Advisor, who coordinates the group’s work, is fully integrated into the
National Security Council policymaking process and attends most meetings of the President’s national security
policymakers that take place at the White House. This includes meetings of the National Security Council,
which the President chairs and consists of heads of relevant national security departments and agencies;
Principals Committee meetings, which the National Security Advisor chairs, but otherwise has the same level
of attendees as the NSC meetings; and Deputies Committee meetings, which a Deputy National Security
Advisor chairs and include deputy level participants from the national security departments and agencies. The
inclusion of the National Security Council legal adviser (who now is dual-hatted as Deputy Counsel to the
President for National Security Affairs) in these meetings has been the practice since the Clinton
Administration, but was formalized in the Trump Administration in its Presidential Memorandum setting out
the organization of the National Security Council Process. Organization of the National Security Council, the
Homeland Security Council, and Subcommittees, 82 FR 16881 (April 4, 2017).
98. John Bellinger, Charlie Savage and the NSC Lawyers Group, LAWFARE (Nov. 8, 2015, 11:25 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/charlie-savage-and-nsc-lawyers-group [https://perma.cc/TJ76-WD22]. See also
Jennifer N. Marett, The National Security Council Legal Adviser: Crafting Legal Positions in War and Peace,
8 J. NATL SEC. L. & POL’Y 153, 168 (2015).
99. Bellinger, supra note 98.
100. SAVAGE, supra note 61, at 64–65. Savage describes the role of the Lawyers Group in the Obama
Administration: it “provided advice to the policymakers at each stage in the bureaucratic process, taking assign-
ments from them and presenting legal issues in high-level meetings.” Id.; see Koh, National Security Legal
Advice, supra note 93.
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Bauer’s failure to recognize this Lawyers Group as the process by which
national security legal advice develops leads him to focus almost exclusively on
the formal opinion-writing role of OLC. By delegation from the Attorney
General, the Assistant Attorney General for OLC provides authoritative legal
advice to the President and all the Executive Branch agencies.101 OLC has the
authority to provide a definitive Executive Branch position—when asked—on
domestic law questions.102 OLC lawyers often carry out that responsibility by
writing formal legal opinions, including on national security issues.103 But in the
national security Lawyers Group process, OLC representatives play a somewhat
different and less formal role because of the nature of the group and its delibera-
tions. The OLC representatives in that process operate much as other Lawyers
Group participants do—they give the benefit of their expertise and perspective,
but, until asked otherwise, contribute informal views, rather than formal legal
opinions.104 The OLC representatives are key participants in these legal discus-
sions, but they are not alone, and they are fully aware of the policy and factual
context of the issues they are considering. Thus, the advice does not develop in
the kind of cloistered environment that Bauer describes.105
101. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, https://www.justice.gov/olc [https://perma.cc/
QX39-5HNY] (last visited Feb. 22, 2018).
102. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Determination, supra note 90, at 1305 (“When the views of the Office
of Legal Counsel are sought on the question of the legality of a proposed executive branch action, those views
are typically treated as conclusive and binding within the executive branch.”).
103. See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for the Special Assistant to the President and Legal Adviser to the National
Security Council, Placing of United States Armed Forces Under United Nations Operational or Tactical Control,
20 U.S. OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 182 (May 8, 1996); Memorandum Opinion from Randolph D. Moss, Assistant
Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for the Attorney General, Authorization for
Continuing Hostilities in Kosovo, 24 U.S. OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 327 (Dec. 19, 2000), https://www.justice.
gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2000/12/31/op-olc-v024-p0327.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2JB-SJ83]; Memorandum
Opinion from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for
the Deputy Counsel to the President, The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations
Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them (Sept. 25, 2001), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/
opinions/2001/09/31/op-olc-v025-p0188_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TPC-HD7X]; Memorandum from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, Application of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A to the Combined Use of Certain Techniques in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda
Detainees (May 10, 2005), https://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/pdf/PDF%2016%20[Bradbury%20Memo%
20to%20Rizzo%20Certain%20Techniques%2010%20May%20200.pdf [https://perma.cc/XN3X-WYL7]; David
J. Barron, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Memorandum for the
Attorney General, Applicability of Federal Criminal Laws and the Constitution to Contemplated Lethal
Operations Against Shaykh Anwar al-Aulaqi (July 16, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/
pages/attachments/2015/04/02/2010-07-16_-_olc_aaga_barron_-_al-aulaqi.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BSV-JSW5];
Memorandum Opinion from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for the Attorney General, Authority to Use Military Force in Libya (April 1,
2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2011/04/31/authority-military-use-in-libya_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8N34-ZZJG].
104. SeeDeRosa & Regan,Deliberative Constitutionalism, supra note 18, at 34.
105. Id. Some have argued that the Lawyers Group process contributes to a decline in the influence of OLC
on national security issues. See Jack Goldsmith, The Decline of OLC, LAWFARE (Oct. 28, 2015, 6:11 PM),
2018] THE BEST VIEW AS A REGULATIVE IDEAL 293
C. A MORE FLEXIBLE BEST VIEW APPROACH
Bauer is correct, then, to question the value of a separation model for providing
legal advice in a national security crisis. Where he goes astray is in assuming that
to reject separation requires abandoning a best view approach altogether.
According to Bauer, the lawyers “seem today stuck between the two choices: an
insistence that law remains a factor unto itself, as insulated as possible from pol-
icy and political currents, or a more flinty-eyed acceptance that it must yield
more ground to high policy in national security.”106 Bauer’s “flinty-eyed”
approach, which he favors during times of crisis, would not insist on a best view
standard, but would instead accept a range of “reasonable,” “plausible,” or “avail-
able” legal grounds.107
In fact, rejection of the separation model does not require lawyers to abandon a
best view approach. It is true that immersion of lawyers in the policy process
makes adhering to a best view approach more difficult. First, the close relation-
ship with policymakers leaves lawyers more subject to pressure to come out a cer-
tain way in their advice. More subtly, lawyers sometimes lose sight of their
distinctive role in the policy process—to provide high-quality legal advice—and
assume the role of simply another policy advisor.
Although these pressures make it more challenging for lawyers to adhere to a
best view standard, there are incentives, grounded primarily in professional iden-
tity, that operate in the other direction. Jack Goldsmith has said one such check
for him as an OLC lawyer was “the powerful culture at OLC of detachment, pro-
fessional integrity, and loyalty to the institution and to the law.”108 The Lawyers
Group process provides another key protection for its members. The process
offers a forum of legal peers with whom lawyers can discuss challenging legal
questions and develop high-quality advice. Even more important, the group
dynamic reinforces the lawyers’ distinct professional identity and strengthens its
members in their interactions with clients. “If legal advice is unwelcome, the law-
yer is not alone; the backing of peers in the Lawyers Group strengthens his or her
position.”109
Thus, the best view standard is far more flexible than Bauer describes and can
survive exposure to policy decision-making. As the next section explains, the
https://www.lawfareblog.com/decline-olc [https://perma.cc/5KMH-3FCA]. The less formal role in the
Lawyers Group arguably dilutes OLC’s position in some respects because it is operating as one member of a
group, but it increases their influence in other ways. Typically, outside of the national security context, OLC
does not become involved in the day-to-day formulation of legal advice by agency lawyers. Instead, they
provide advice orally or in writing on particularly difficult or controversial legal issues, but only when the
client comes to them with discrete questions. The Lawyers Group process broadens OLC’s role by involving it
at an earlier stage in the development of legal advice. OLC retains its unique status as the “last word” on
domestic law issues, but in the Lawyers Group process they operate more informally.
106. Bauer, supra note 1, at 181.
107. Id. at 240–41, 250.
108. Goldsmith, Reflections, supra note 89, at 196.
109. DeRosa & Regan, Deliberative Constitutionalism, supra note 18, at 35.
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best view model protects high-quality lawyering by acting as a regulative ideal
and supporting key responsibilities of government lawyers. It is important, there-
fore, to preserve it as a standard for national security lawyers.
III. THE “BEST VIEW” MODEL PROTECTS HIGH-QUALITY LAWYERING
As discussed in Section I, national security lawyers often operate with less
clarity about the law, less access to others with expertise, and less formal account-
ability than lawyers who practice in other areas. These factors can impact the
quality of national security legal advice, particularly in a crisis. This relative lack
of formal, external accountability heightens the need for internal mechanisms
that provide incentives for lawyers to do their job well. The best view model is
such a mechanism—and a critical one.
A. THE BEST VIEW STANDARD AS A REGULATIVE IDEAL
It is fair to ask whether it is even possible to identify a “best view” of the law
for national security issues. Bauer describes well the difficulties of finding the
“correct” answer to any legal question. Lawyers confront fast-moving proposals
for which relevant facts are hard to pin down and change quickly. Judicial prece-
dent, as discussed above, is limited, and there are relatively few determinative
sources on which lawyers can rely.110 Lawyers can rarely say with any certainty
that they have the “right” answer and applying a best view standard is certainly
no guarantee that they will get there. Randolph Moss addressed this challenge to
the best view approach in his 2000 article:
Scholars have labored for years over the question whether the law is
determinate—that is, whether legal dilemmas admit of right and wrong
answers. In one sense this question is more theoretical than real. Lawyers,
legislators, and judges operate on a daily basis on the understanding that
there are right and wrong answers in the law, or, at least, answers that do
and must govern relevant conduct. Theory, moreover, in my view, com-
ports with this reality. The law involves a vast array of principles and
precedents. The best view of the law is that which provides the most coher-
ent explanation of those principles and precedents.111
A best view standard for legal advice does not guarantee the right answer to ev-
ery legal question—that would be impossible. Seeking the best view, however,
will lead good lawyers toward better answers. Moreover, the best view approach
serves a broader and more important purpose than finding the correct answer in a
particular case. The standard serves as a regulative ideal: a critical guidepost for
lawyers seeking legal answers in this difficult environment.112 Applying a best
110. See supra notes 19–48 and accompanying text.
111. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Determination, supra note 90, at 1321.
112. See Schott, Chapter VII as Exception: Security Council Action and the Regulative Ideal of Emergency,
6 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 24 (2008).
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view standard helps lawyers advising on national security remain focused on their
distinctive role in the process—a role that assumes responsibility for the legality
of individual policy decisions and, critically, the integrity of executive branch
law. The best view provides an external professional standard of conduct to guide
their analysis. It serves as a counterweight, grounded in a sense of professional
identity, to the inevitable pressures that these lawyers face.
A regulative ideal provides a guide for those practicing in a field with relatively
few clear limits. One writer described the value of a regulative ideal in the very
different context of insurance law. In considering the principle of upholding the
reasonable expectations of the insured, he explained:
That principle serves as a regulative ideal: the expression of a value that should
help to shape the development of insurance law. Honoring policyholders’ rea-
sonable expectations is not something we can always achieve; in fact, it is not
something we will always even attempt to achieve. But honoring reasonable
expectations as to coverage is a good of sufficient importance that we should
continually measure our progress toward achieving that good in a world of in-
surance that is limited by imperfect information, strategic behavior, the partial
incompatibility of that good with other goods, and the practical compromises
that markets are always in the process of making.113
Thus, even if the true “best view” often is unknowable, the best view standard
promotes high-quality lawyering by giving lawyers a goal and a standard by
which to order their deliberations. The best view standard operates as a lodestar.
To set the standard lower—to set the goal of lawyers’ deliberations as identifying
one of many possible answers that is not clearly illegal—would remove this im-
portant incentive. There will be little to guide the lawyers other than the preferen-
ces of policymakers. Moreover, for the same reason that it is difficult to identify
the “right” answer, it will be hard to distinguish between an answer that is “avail-
able” and one that crosses a line to simply wrong. Giving lawyers permission to
exercise this kind of flexibility will inevitably reduce the quality of advice
overall.
B. THE BEST VIEW STANDARD SUPPORTS THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
The best view standard also protects high-quality lawyering by supporting the
duties of Executive Branch lawyers to uphold the public interest and, in particu-
lar, the President’s constitutional responsibilities. It is widely accepted as a gen-
eral proposition that government lawyers have an obligation to serve the public
113. Kenneth S. Abraham, The Expectations Principle as a Regulative Ideal, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 59, 63
(1998). See also Jared Schott, supra note 112, at 25. Schott uses the concept of regulative ideal “to link Chapter
VII practice and emergency powers both descriptively and normatively. It concedes that the perfect superimpo-
sition of the doctrine of legitimate emergency onto Council practice is ‘essentially unrealizable,’ but neverthe-
less holds that such counterfactual criteria can and should guide our practice.” (citations omitted).
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interest in their practice in a way that differs from their private sector counter-
parts.114 What this means in practice, however, is far from clear. How does any
individual lawyer discern the public interest so that he or she can apply it?
Indeed, is it even the lawyer’s job to determine what is in the public interest?
When it comes to policy matters, policymakers and democratically elected offi-
cials would often seem to be in a better position to identify the public interest
than their lawyers.
In the Executive Branch, however, there is one element of the public interest
that lawyers are in the best position to address: the President’s constitutional
responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”115 The Take
Care Clause imposes, at least, a constitutional responsibility on the President of
fidelity to the intention and purpose of the law.116 This obligation makes the task
of Executive Branch lawyers different from their counterparts advising private
sector clients. Private sector lawyers, when advising their clients, will often pro-
vide them several options and explain the risks that an option will be found—by
the Executive Branch or the courts—to reflect an incorrect interpretation of the
law. Clients then assess how much risk of illegality to assume. This approach to
private sector lawyering reflects the fact that private sector clients do not exercise
governmental power, nor do they bear any responsibility for the law’s execution.
The President and Executive Branch have additional responsibilities. In keeping
with those constitutional obligations, the President must do more than assess the
risks that someone will conclude he was wrong. The President must “faithfully”
strive to be right. Seeking the best view of the law when advising on the legality
114. See Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, And Will Government Lawyers
Serve The Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 789–790 (2000).
115. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
116. See David Luban, “That The Laws Be Faithfully Executed”: The Perils of the Government Legal
Advisor, 38 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1043, 1050 (2012) (“All lawyers, as I have said, have a duty to give candid and
independent advice, but executive branch lawyers have an even more powerful obligation to play the law
straight. Article II of the Constitution obligates the President to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed.’
Not just executed, but faithfully executed. That word ‘faithfully’ is here to do some work. It is a warning that
the President, above all, must not try to loophole the law . . . .”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); Moss,
Executive Branch Legal Determination, supra note 90, at 1312–13 (“[T]he Take Care Clause seems, on its
face, to speak directly to the question [of the appropriateness of the best view standard]. It provides that the
President ‘shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.’ The addition of the word ‘faithfully’ demon-
strates the Framer’s intent to stress the President’s obligation to perform his duties with a steadfast and prin-
cipled adherence to the law. The obligation is not to execute the law in a reasonable or colorable manner, but
in a faithfulmanner.”) (citations omitted). Moss also points to the Presidential Oath Clause in Article VI, clause
3 of the Constitution, which sets out a special oath for the President. The President must swear that he “will
faithfully execute the office of the President of the United States, and will to the best of [his] Ability, preserve,
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.” Id. at 1314. Moss argues that this second reference to
faithfully executing his duties—which include the duty articulated in the Take Care Clause—reinforces the
Take Care obligation. Id. at 1314–15. See also Barron, Best Practices, supra note 5, at 1 (noting that OLC’s
core function of providing legal advice is in service to the President’s “constitutional duties to preserve, protect,
and defend the Constitution, and to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” It goes on to explain that
for this reason it is “imperative that the Office’s advice be clear, accurate, thoroughly researched, and soundly
executed”).
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of presidential actions is the surest—perhaps the only—way for the President’s
lawyers to assist him in upholding this responsibility.
IV. ASSESSING BAUER’S PROPOSAL
Bauer is generally critical of the best view approach for lawyering. As dis-
cussed, this criticism reflects an overly rigid view of how a best view approach
operates and underplays the importance of that approach to high-quality lawyer-
ing in this area. Nonetheless, Bauer does not propose eliminating the best view
approach in all cases. Instead, he argues only that national security lawyers
should depart from a best view standard in situations of national security crisis. In
practice, however, the limitation to crisis that Bauer proposes is unworkable.
With no definition of “crisis” and no effective protections against expansion,
Bauer’s exception to a best view approach would easily become the norm, with
serious implications for the overall quality of national security lawyering.
A. BAUER’S PROPOSAL
Bauer’s article focuses specifically on legal advice during a “condition of cri-
sis.”117 He examines two fascinating historical examples of lawyering during a
crisis: Attorney General Robert Jackson’s memorandum advising President
Franklin Roosevelt on the legality of selling U.S. destroyers to Great Britain dur-
ing World War II and the advice from State Department Legal Adviser Abram
Chayes and other State Department lawyers during the Cuban Missile Crisis of
1962. Bauer traces how highly respected lawyers in these circumstances gave
advice that most would agree did not represent the best view of the law.
Nonetheless, these lawyers have received little criticism. In Bauer’s view—and,
in fact, most observers would agree—the actions of these two men were appropri-
ate under the circumstances. Bauer draws from these examples the conclusion
that national security crisis calls for a softening of the best view approach.
In Bauer’s view, a crisis demands “a renovation of process and the adoption of
an interpretive standard that accommodates more flexibility than that of ‘best
view.’”118 Under those circumstances, the lawyers would work closely with poli-
cymakers, not at an “artificial or carefully cultivated distance.”119 Some senior
lawyer, usually the White House Counsel, would run an ad hoc interagency pro-
cess to develop legal advice120 that is “less OLC-centric and more flexible.”121
117. Bauer, supra note 1, at 179–80.
118. Id. at 249.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 249–50.
121. Id. at 253. Although the focus of this Comment is on Bauer’s discussion of the best view standard, his
process proposal also poses significant danger. First, it relies on Bauer’s puzzling failure to recognize the
Lawyers Group process, see supra notes 92– 103 and accompanying text, and his mistaken view, as discussed
in Sections II. A. and B., that the current process for national security legal decision-making maintains a “care-
fully cultivated distance from the policy apparatus.” Id. at 249. This is simply not the case. Bauer focuses on
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Critically, the process would allow for consideration of “legal, policy, political,
public communication, and other considerations.”122 The lawyers in this process
would then be free to develop, in good faith, a professionally responsible legal
defense of the desired policy, even if that is not what they would deem the best
view. Thus, there would be, in these crisis circumstances, “no requirement for a
‘best view’ and no incentive to pretend that one had met that requirement.”123
Among the virtues of this approach in crisis situations, according to Bauer, is
that it “does not hide its mode of operation: it better captures how the process
functions, how the lawyers can be expected to perform, under intense policy pres-
sure.”124 It replaces the “idealized” best view standard with a more realistic
approach. It would not only relieve lawyers of the need to overstate the strength
of their legal position, but it would relieve the President of the political conse-
quences of disregarding legal advice deemed the “best view,” when a good faith
legal argument exists that supports critical policy.125
Bauer would insist on transparency as a “critical condition” on adoption of his
model.126 This includes “a full accounting to the public of the structure of the
legal team responsible for the analysis and the substance of the legal position the
Administration eventually adopted.”127 Recognizing the limited judicial oversight
of executive national security decisions, Bauer considers transparency to be “the
essential checking mechanism.”128 The transparency he proposes is not “piece-
meal disclosures” and cannot be “accomplished by leaks to the press.”129 Instead,
he envisions a “formal accounting, in all practicable detail” of the process and
decisions.130 The power of transparency and an informed public, Bauer argues,
should not be underrated.131 It would provide a “check—necessarily but vitally a
political check” on Executive Branch temptations to overstate a crisis or claim a
the role of OLC in national security legal decision-making. OLC plays a critical role in the Lawyer’s Group
process, but there is nothing about that role that interferes with the Group’s ability to work closely with policy
makers.
Moreover, the proposal to jettison the Lawyers Group in crisis situations would undermine that process, per-
haps fatally. Although the Lawyers Group has been in use, in one form or another, since the 1990s, there is
nothing that requires a president or his lawyers to use the process. For the process to survive requires a broad ac-
ceptance of its value and an understanding that it is the default process for developing legal advice for high-
level national security decision makers. Ad hoc departures during the most critical times would threaten this
acceptance. In addition, adoption of an ad hoc process would interfere with the dynamics of the group, which
are key to its success. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
122. Id at 250.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 254.
125. Id. at 255–57.
126. Id. at 251.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 254.
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legal basis when none exists by assuring “that the issue will be openly joined.”132
Thus, Bauer articulates two protections against expansion or abuse of his more
flexible legal standard. First, it would operate only in times of national security
crisis and, second, full transparency about its use would operate as an effective
political check. In practice, however, neither of these provide real protection
against expansion or abuse of the ad hoc process Bauer describes.
B. LIMITATION TO “CRISIS” IS UNWORKABLE
As discussed above, much of the power of the best view standard is as a regula-
tive ideal, a norm that provides an incentive for high-quality lawyering.133 But to
work in this manner it cannot be viewed as optional. Developing a best view is
difficult work. Advising clients of the best view can be challenging as well. For
national security lawyers to take on this burden, it is important that they under-
stand it to be a requirement for high-quality lawyering. Thus, an exception for cri-
sis, which suggests the best view approach is not necessary when the policy truly
matters, undermines, perhaps fatally, its power as a regulative ideal.
Compounding this problem is the concern that nothing about Bauer’s proposal
would effectively limit its application to the “crisis conditions,” much less the
kind of existential crises that Bauer’s examples of World War II and the Cuban
Missile Crisis represent. Indeed, Bauer does not provide any definition of what he
means by “crisis.” He acknowledges that the line between “crisis and the regular
but still pressing, even urgent flow of events” is difficult to pin down and would
be “necessarily open to disagreement.”134 He concludes, therefore, that it is not
useful to identify factors or criteria that will trigger this new process.135 Instead,
he proposes that a decision about what circumstances call for the ad hoc process
will be left to the Executive to determine. The protection against overuse will
be political: the executive will be required to answer to the public for that
decision.136
Thus, “crisis” will be defined entirely by the President at the time of decision,
with no clear guideposts on which he or his lawyers can draw. It is the nature of
national security policy that many, perhaps most, issues feel like a crisis to those
in the middle of them. National security lawyers and policymakers confront
issues every day that, directly or indirectly, involve life, death, and safety. If
“crisis” does not refer to grave or existential threats and, indeed, has no definition
at all—if it is in the eye of the beholder—it is not only possible, but virtually inev-
itable that what Bauer intends as an exceptional process would become
commonplace.
132. Id.
133. Supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text.
134. Bauer, supra note 1, at 252.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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C. TRANSPARENCY ALONE IS AN INADEQUATE CHECK
Bauer next proposes a requirement of transparency about legal advice as the
critical protection against abuse of his departure from the best view standard.137
This transparency, he says, will ensure that the public will be able to identify
flaws and errors in legal advice and the President and other policymakers will be
held politically accountable.138 Bauer and others have described the many bene-
fits of transparency as an accountability mechanism for national security pol-
icy.139 Transparency permits the public to assess for itself whether its government
is balancing correctly the many competing interests that national security policy
affects.140 Transparency is, therefore, necessary to obtain the broad, long-term
public support that national security programs and policies require.141 Transparency
about national security legal advice has the same salutary effect. Exposure of legal
advice to public scrutiny and criticism often will reveal weaknesses or expose
flawed assumptions underlying the work.142 The knowledge that legal advice may
become public will also tend to make lawyers more careful to think through poten-
tial criticism in advance, increasing the quality of advice.
Bauer is correct that transparency is a powerful check. The problem with rely-
ing exclusively on transparency as a protection against abuse is that it is too diffi-
cult to institutionalize and too easy to avoid. It is the nature of national security
policy that much of the information at issue is sensitive. The risks that transpar-
ency poses to ongoing policies is greater than in any other field. It should go with-
out saying that shielding some national security programs and policies from
public view is necessary for them to function properly. For this reason, most
national security institutional players see it as their responsibility to protect the se-
crecy of their information.143 Very few actors within the national security commu-
nity consider promoting transparency to be their responsibility. Jack Goldsmith
described this phenomenon with transparency of legal advice in a speech to
Intelligence Community lawyers:
You tend to approach issues of secrecy versus transparency ad hoc and in the
context of litigation. My sense is that in the FOIA context in particular, the
137. Id. at 251.
138. Id.
139. See id. See also Jack Goldsmith, My Speech at ODNI Legal Conference: “Toward Greater
Transparency of National Security Legal Work”, LAWFARE (May 12, 2015, 8:30 AM), https://www.
lawfareblog.com/my-speech-odni-legal-conference-toward-greater-transparency-national-security-legal-work
[https://perma.cc/Z2HA-WERH] [hereinafter Goldsmith, Toward Greater Transparency]; Rachel Brand,
Transparency in the Intelligence Community, LAWFARE (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
transparency-intelligence-community [https://perma.cc/VT7G-7EUX]; Ben Wittes, Lessons on Detention from
Capt. Patrick McCarthy’s Talk at MILOPS, LAWFARE (May 1, 2014), https://www.lawfareblog.com/lessons-
detention-capt-patrick-mccarthys-talk-milops [https://perma.cc/FBD3-T9JY].
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. SeeGoldsmith, Toward Greater Transparency, supra note 139.
143. Id.
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Justice Department’s relatively narrow focus on winning the legal or disclo-
sure issue prevails at the expense of the medium-term (but harder-to-measure)
risk of losing credibility before the courts. The litigation context in which
these issues often arise, combined with the fact that you are enormously busy
keeping the country safe, means that you have little [time] to step back and
consider systemic costs and benefits of your transparency practices, or organi-
zational reforms.144
In this atmosphere, arguments for transparency are challenging within the
national security policy structure. The potential harm from release of information
on national security decisions is direct, definable, and immediate. The benefits of
transparency are indirect, imprecise, and tend to focus on long-term goals of
good government and rule of law. Indeed, in the short-term, transparency rarely
results in applause from the public—the opposite is more likely. That is why
most public releases of information about national security legal advice in the
years since 9/11 have resulted from leaks.145 Thus, for a policy of transparency to
take hold, there must be sustained, high-level commitment to relatively abstract
goals. This is not impossible, but experience tells us it is quite rare.
Transparency is a potentially powerful check on national security policy-
makers. But it is inadequate as the sole protection against abuse of the process
Bauer proposes because it relies on the policymakers recognizing its value and
enforcing the discipline upon themselves. This is simply unrealistic.
CONCLUSION
If the best view standard is a necessary protection for high-quality Executive
Branch lawyering, what does that say about the actions of Attorney General
Jackson and State Department Legal Adviser Abram Chayes? Does it mean if
those situations recurred, the lawyers facing them should declare the Presidents’
policies—selling destroyers to the British, who were at war with Nazi Germany
and instituting a naval “quarantine” during the Cuban Missile Crisis—illegal?
Did Jackson and Chayes do the wrong thing?
In fact, given those circumstances, most lawyers—including those who value
the best view approach—would agree that Jackson and Chayes acted appropri-
ately. An argument for the best view standard must acknowledge this reality.
To Bauer, the fact that lawyers in some exceptional circumstances must push
the envelope in their legal advice, argues for a separate standard and process for
those occasions. To do so is more honest, he says, because the lawyers will have
144. Id.
145. See Goldsmith, My Speech, supra note 139 (“An amazing number of very highly classified programs
have been revealed to the public in the last eleven years. These revelations included a lot of Executive branch
legal work related to these programs—by my rough count, at least several hundred documents. The vast major-
ity of these disclosures involved insider leaks to the press followed by shamefaced government production in
reaction to leaks.”).
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“no incentive to pretend”146 that they gave, and the President relied on, the best
view. In addition, a process that approves these departures will relieve the
President of criticism he might face for relying on a legal analysis that is some-
thing less than “the best.”147
There is significant danger, however, in lowering the legal standard to accom-
modate these situations. The problem with Bauer’s proposal is that by creating a
separate standard and process to address these exceptional circumstances, he
makes these departures easier; less politically painful for the President and carry-
ing fewer reputational risks for the lawyers. The virtually guaranteed result would
be that these exceptional departures become more common. As discussed, this
would undermine the regulative force of the best view norm, which is a critical
protection for high-quality national security lawyering.
Departing from the best view might sometimes be necessary, but it should not
be easy. If the President and his lawyers understand that they will absorb criticism
for adopting a strained interpretation of the law—or even one they know to be
incorrect—they will be more cautious about taking that step. If the need is great,
they will accept the risks. It will be a difficult decision—but it should be.
146. Bauer, supra note 1, at 250.
147. Id. at 255.
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